The leftover hash lemma is a lemma in cryptography first stated by Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid Levin, and Michael Luby. Given a secret key X that has n uniform random bits, of which an adversary was able to learn the values of some t < n bits of that key, the leftover hash lemma states that it is possible to produce a key of about n − t bits, over which the adversary has almost no knowledge, without knowing which t are known to the adversary.
The leftover hash lemma is a lemma in cryptography first stated by Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid Levin, and Michael Luby. Given a secret key X that has n uniform random bits, of which an adversary was able to learn the values of some t < n bits of that key, the leftover hash lemma states that it is possible to produce a key of about n − t bits, over which the adversary has almost no knowledge, without knowing which t are known to the adversary.
Source: Wikipedia "Leftover hash lemma" · CC BY-SA 4.0
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